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“From Same-Sex to No Sex”?: Trends Towards 
Recognition of (Same-Sex) Relationships in 
Canada1 
Susan B. Boyd 
Claire F.L. Young 
Because a universalist encompassing modernity cannot allow of 
an engendering position apart from itself, its own ‘self’ creates the 
other against which it is constituted.  Not only that, not only must 
the other be absolutely excluded from an encompassing 
modernity, this very quality of encompassment means that the 
other must also be included… 
This imperialism, as an affirmation of the universal, was 
integrally committed to the civilizing of the colonized, to bringing 
them into the fold of general humanity and, in that sense, it was 
committed to rendering them the same.  The colonized were 
conveniently seen as yearning in the depths of their being for this 
very consummation. 2 
The analysis of the author quoted above prompts a questioning of the 
terms on which groups that have traditionally been treated as “other” in 
modern societies, such as lesbians and gay men, are eventually included 
into the dominant system.  It also reveals why the terms of this inclusion 
may result in the diminishing of the radical potential of the “othered” 
group in relation to social transformation.  In turn, the dominant system 
may be reinforced even as it extends its citizenship to those who did not 
formerly belong.  In this article, we explore this aporia through a case 
study of the trends towards legal recognition of same-sex partnerships in 
Canada. 
We seek also to broaden the terms of the debate about recognition, 
which often focuses on marriage, particularly in the United States.  One of 
us attended a panel on Same Sex Marriage at the 2001 annual conference 
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of the American Law and Society Association in Budapest.  All of the 
papers were given by American scholars.  During discussion time, Didi 
Herman asked whether there was space in the current political climate to 
discuss whether or not marriage was the key political goal of the 
lesbian/gay community.  The male panellists shuffled, and chuckled, a 
little uncomfortably, and asked the one woman on the panel, lesbian 
feminist law professor Nancy Polikoff, to respond.  Overall, the 
impression was conveyed that there was not much space for discussion of 
the various political strategies open to the lesbian and gay communities.  
And yet, many strong voices have been raised against the obviousness of 
the strategy of seeking inclusion within “the family” or marriage, and the 
implications of this strategy.  Many of those voices have been lesbians and 
lesbian feminists.3 
It is our view that this closing down of space for discussion of strategies 
that do not focus on marriage or spousal recognition as an “end” in itself is 
problematic.  Drawing on critical literature on “the family,” we work from 
a position that recognizes that marriage, and perhaps family law itself, has 
a history that is deeply interconnected with relations of oppression both 
within families and within society.  As Shane Phelan succinctly puts it: 
“Families are the very model of patriarchy, characterized by inequality 
along several dimensions.  In patriarchy, fathers rule over mothers, parents 
over children, seemingly by nature.”4  We should all be familiar with, and 
keep in mind, the ways in which marriage has operated to reproduce 
women’s dependency and inequality.  Furthermore, in Canada, marriage 
has provided a mechanism for the imposition of patriarchal and oppressive 
norms on Aboriginal communities, with particular consequences for 
Aboriginal women.5  
Even the family law reforms of the past three decades, which have 
sought to ameliorate women’s status within marriage and their economic 
inequality at marriage breakdown, are arguably stop-gap measures that 
camouflage the continuing negative consequences of marriage for many 
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women.6  Challenges to familial hierarchies, although they have occurred 
legally and socially, especially during the last three decades, “have not 
been established beyond legal or social contention.”7  Nor have “queer 
families” necessarily challenged the ways in which families operate to 
perpetuate various hierarchies and inequalities, perhaps particularly 
economic hierarchies.8 
Why, then, we ask, is not just spousal recognition, but also marriage, so 
clearly back on the political agenda for gays and lesbians, not only in the 
United States, where common law relationships have not received as much 
legal recognition, but also in Canada where they have?  What political 
dilemmas does this development pose for critical thinkers and lesbians and 
gay men who are committed to social justice? 
Our goals in this article are threefold: 
1. To describe the recent multi-fold Canadian developments, mainly 
in relation to recognition of same-sex partners as “spouses.”  
These have taken a somewhat different trajectory than the 
American ones and may accordingly raise somewhat different 
questions. 
2. To identify and question the terms on which these developments 
are occurring, and what tends to be left out of the discussion.  In 
this part, we focus on the neo-liberal political climate of the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries; this in turn leads to the 
privatizing and individualizing consequences of legal recognition 
of intimate relationships. 
3. To play on our own ambivalence about spousal recognition 
strategies in order to open new avenues of thought. 
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CANADIAN LEGAL TRENDS: THE TERMS OF INCLUSION 
Introduction 
Canada is somewhat distinct from many countries with respect to the 
evolution of lesbian and gay claims to equality.  First, relatively strong 
human rights codes exist both provincially and federally.  These codes 
were strengthened by the constitutional entrenchment of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the 1980s.9  Second, since the 1970s, 
Canada has increasingly recognized common law heterosexual 
relationships through ascription for many legal purposes, a trend that is 
quite distinct from that in the United States.  Based on a period of 
cohabitation, many, but not all, of the rights and duties of marriage have 
been extended to common law couples.  Since the mid-1990s, same-sex 
couples have increasingly, though unevenly across provinces, been treated 
as common law couples.  Thus, for example, same-sex cohabitants are 
treated as spouses for income tax purposes,10 their entitlement to social 
assistance payments may be reduced if they have a partner, and they are 
spouses for a myriad of family law purposes including having the right to 
sue ex-partners for spousal support.11  
Legal claims to equality by lesbians and gay men in Canada are also 
complicated by jurisdictional issues.  Some matters, such as human rights, 
lie in the domain of both the provinces and the federal government, with 
every province and the federal government having enacted human rights 
legislation.  Other matters, such as the legal definition of marriage as 
opposite sex, divorce, and immigration, are the sole prerogative of the 
federal government.  Others, such as the division of matrimonial property 
and the issuance of marriage licenses, are the sole prerogative of the 
provinces. 
It is against this backdrop that lesbian and gay claims to equality have 
been pursued.  If success is defined as legal and political victories that 
have helped to redress discrimination against lesbians and gay men and 
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their exclusion from legal regimes such as family law, then looking back 
over the last few decades it can be said that, despite some early setbacks, 
those claims have been relatively successful.  Early claims to equality 
were brought under human rights legislation and tended to focus on 
challenging discrimination in the workplace.  These early claims included 
challenges to dismissal from employment or the denial of promotion.12  At 
the same time, another stream of cases emerged in the employment 
context, those that focused on the denial of “spousal” or “family” benefits 
to same-sex partners.  These cases were the forerunners of later Charter 
challenges to heterosexist definitions of spouse in federal and provincial 
legislation.  One of the most notable of these pre-Charter cases was 
Mossop v. Treasury Board of Canada,13 in which a gay man argued that to 
deny him bereavement leave to attend the funeral of his male partner’s 
father discriminated against him on the basis of “family status” in 
contravention of the Canadian Human Rights Act.  He was unsuccessful in 
his claim, in part, because the court held that the discrimination was on the 
basis of sexual orientation, not family status, and, at the time the 
bereavement leave was denied, sexual orientation was not a prohibited 
ground of discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Act.14 
Impact of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
The enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 was a 
watershed moment in the evolution of Canadian lesbian and gay claims to 
equality.  In particular, the “equality” provision, section 15(1),15 has had a 
profound effect on both the nature of the legal challenges that have been 
brought and also, as we discuss later, the lesbian and gay movement itself.  
That shift can be characterized as a move towards “rights talk” and “rights 
claims”.  It is important to note that “sexual orientation” was not a listed 
prohibited ground of discrimination in the Charter when it was enacted.  
An amendment to add “sexual orientation” as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination when the Charter was at the committee stage was defeated.  
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This defeat was likely in part because the Minister of Justice at the time 
(Jean Chrétien) answered in the affirmative when asked whether the 
government was allowing for the possibility that the courts might interpret 
the open-ended list of prohibited grounds of discrimination to include 
additional grounds of discrimination.16  It was not until 1995, however, 
that the Supreme Court of Canada in Egan confirmed that “sexual 
orientation” was an analogous prohibited ground of discrimination.17  
During the 1990s, the Charter was used with great success by lesbians 
and gay men to challenge discriminatory laws.18  In addition to Egan, 
three other cases in which litigants argued that a legislative provision 
discriminated against lesbians and gay men deserve a brief comment.  In 
each case, a particular legislative provision was found to discriminate 
against lesbians and gay men on the basis of sexual orientation, leading to 
legislative change to the impugned provision.  But these cases also set the 
ball rolling in terms of governments moving inexorably towards ensuring 
that same-sex couples received many of the same rights and 
responsibilities that heterosexual common law couples already had, 
regardless of whether or not there was a Charter challenge in progress.  
These decisions set the scene for the dramatic legislative change that 
occurred both at the federal and provincial levels in 1999 and subsequent 
years. 
In Vriend v. Alberta,19 the issue was the omission from the Alberta 
Individual Rights Protection Act (IRPA)20 of protection against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  Vriend had been 
dismissed from his job as a school teacher because of his sexual 
orientation and he sought to have “sexual orientation” read into the 
Alberta human rights legislation in order to bring an action against his 
former employer.21  The Supreme Court of Canada found that some 
provisions of the IRPA did contravene section 15(1) and were not saved 
by section 1.22  The remedy was to read “sexual orientation” into the 
IRPA.23  The importance of this decision is that it forced a government 
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that had until then refused to grant basic human rights protection to 
lesbians and gay men to do so.  Indeed as Margot Young has commented, 
“[t]he symbolic consequences of this pronouncement in a province where 
political, religious, and other public figures pride themselves on their 
hostility to lesbian and gay rights are considerable.”24 
Another groundbreaking case was Rosenberg v. Canada (Att’y Gen.),25  
which has been described as symbolizing “a new era in the struggle for 
lesbian and gay equality.”26  In that case, the Ontario Court of Appeal held 
that the words “or same-sex” should be read into the definition of spouse 
in the Income Tax Act,27 for the purpose of registration of pension plans.  
This ruling effectively extended entitlement to survivor benefits under 
occupational pension plans to the partners of lesbians and gay men who 
die while covered by the plan.  But the decision had far reaching 
consequences.  The federal government did not appeal the decision to the 
Supreme Court of Canada and in due course amended the definition of 
spouse in the Income Tax Act to include same-sex couples as spouses for 
all tax purposes.28  While this move might be seen as progressive, in fact it 
is—as we discuss later—highly problematic.  
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered the most important 
judicial decision to date on spousal recognition in M. v. H.29  There the 
Court granted a lesbian the ability to claim spousal support from her 
former partner by striking down as unconstitutional a definition of 
“spouse” in a family law statute that had been limited to opposite sex 
cohabitants.30  This case has resulted in many legislative changes at both 
federal and provincial levels, as we discuss below.  However, it also 
illustrates a problematic phenomenon that has arisen in many challenges to 
legislation brought by same-sex partners.  The progress that has been 
made, often through the courts, has typically occurred by showing the 
similarity between same-sex partners and opposite-sex partners.  
Thus assimilation discourse that reinforces the heterosexual norm has 
been built into legal process in many ways.  For instance, in M. v. H., 
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although the Supreme Court judges were careful to state that there is no 
need for lesbian litigants to portray their intimate relationships as if they 
were “just like” those of their heterosexual counterparts,31 one of the lower 
court decisions noted that H had been more involved in the shared 
business of the couple, whereas M (the applicant) “appeared content to 
devote more of her time to domestic, rather than business, tasks.”32  
Thus, there is a concern that the need to meet certain criteria (such as 
sharing joint bank accounts) in order to fit within existing legal categories 
such as “spouse,” which often rely on conjugality, will “domesticate” the 
lives of lesbians and gay men.33  Similarly, Australian author Heather 
Brook has suggested that although the concept of coverture inherent 
within marriage has been challenged by many recent law reforms, “its 
(hetero)sexual performatives remain a key trope in marriage and (to a 
lesser extent) marriage-like relationships.”34  Perhaps the impulse towards 
sameness arguments is inevitable when outsider groups invoke equality 
and rights discourse; equality analysis requires a comparator.  The claim is 
typically framed as, “we, Y group, want the same rights that X group 
already possesses, because we are essentially the same as X group in terms 
of the quality and security of our intimate relationships.”  Phelan notes that 
this type of strategy is “part of a larger trajectory in political activism that 
denies the positioning of gays and lesbians as abject and seeks equal status 
as liberal subjects.”35  In a number of respects, the important decision in 
M. v. H. adopted this approach. 
As mentioned above, the litigation successes in Canada prompted 
governments to expand the definition of “spouse” to include same-sex 
couples in an array of laws that assign rights and responsibilities based on 
spousal status.  In 2000, the federal government enacted the 
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act,36 which amended 68 
pieces of federal legislation to recognize same-sex couples, and several 
provinces also extended spousal or equivalent status to same-sex 
couples.37  Most recently, on April 25, 2002, the province of Québec 
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introduced Bill 84,38 which accords the rights and responsibilities of 
married couples to same-sex and opposite-sex unmarried couples who 
enter into a civil union.  The same bill also repeals the opposite sex 
definition of marriage in the Civil Code, although same-sex marriage 
remains prohibited under federal law.39 
As we have demonstrated in this brief history of the evolution of 
equality claims by lesbians and gay men, spousal rights were extended 
(other than in Québec) as a result of an analogy made to rights and 
responsibilities that had already been accorded to unmarried opposite-sex 
cohabitants based, typically, on a period of cohabitation.  Being able to 
argue by analogy for the same status of unmarried opposite-sex 
cohabitants provided a middle political ground to the Canadian lesbian and 
gay movement, whereas in the United States and other jurisdictions 
without this middle ground, it seems that the clearest strategy was to seek 
full marriage rights and duties. 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was invoked successfully 
in many of these cases, has had another important impact on the lesbian 
and gay movement in Canada. Miriam Smith, a political scientist, has 
documented the Charter’s contribution to the shift that occurred from the 
politics of “gay liberation” to more legally-based claims by the lesbian and 
gay movement for rights and equality.  As she notes, “gay liberation grew 
out of the counter-culture of the sixties and its meaning frames were 
transformational, aimed at the elimination of heterosexism, patriarchy and 
sex and gender roles.”40  She traces the role that the Charter played in the 
shift from those aims to a rights-focused movement that relied 
increasingly on litigation as its political strategy to acquire the same rights 
as heterosexual persons, rights that tended to be linked to spousal status.  
The transformation was a shift from the more leftist, radical movement 
that wanted to subvert the realm of sexuality to a more mainstream one 
that wanted to have their “families” recognized by the state.  Urvashi Vaid 
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has similarly noted the mainstreaming of the American lesbian/gay 
movement.41 
The Marriage Cases 
Interestingly, at present in Canada, even though (or perhaps in part 
because) same-sex partners have almost all the same rights and 
responsibilities of common law spouses, there is a renewed emphasis on 
claiming the right to marry by many lesbians and gay men.42  Lesbian 
legal scholar Kathleen Lahey has argued strenuously that without the right 
to marry, lesbians and gay men do not have full legal personality.43  Even 
the Law Commission of Canada in its recent report on personal adult 
relationships has recommended that “[p]arliament and 
provincial/territorial legislatures should move toward removing from their 
laws the restrictions on marriages between persons of the same-sex.”44  
Equality for Lesbians and Gays Everywhere (EGALE), a national 
lesbian/gay lobby group established during the infancy of the Charter and 
one that has been at the forefront of the fight for spousal status, is now 
very involved in litigation challenging the denial of the right to marry to 
same-sex couples.  Its public stance is that same-sex couples should have 
the right to make their own relationship decisions, including the freedom 
to marry for those who choose it.45  EGALE does not argue that all 
lesbians and gay men should choose marriage; rather that it should be a 
choice that is open to them.  
Currently three “marriage” cases are being pursued in Canada, with 
EGALE involved in each one.  In these cases, groups of lesbian and gay 
couples are arguing that the common law definition of marriage as being 
between a man and a woman contravenes the equality rights guarantee of 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and they are asking that the province 
be required to issue them marriage licenses.46  All three of these cases 
have resulted in defeat for the federal government.  Most recently in 
Barbeau v. B. C. (Att’y Gen.), the British Columbia Court of Appeal held 
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that the common law definition of marriage contravened the Charter, and 
reformulated the definition to mean “the lawful union of two persons to 
the exclusion of all others.”47  The court suspended its order until July 12, 
2004 to give the federal and provincial governments time to bring their 
legislation into accord with the decision.48 
Earlier in Halpern v. Canada,49 the Ontario Superior Court also held 
that the common law rule that defines marriage as between one man and 
one woman is constitutionally invalid and inoperative because it 
contravenes the Charter.50  The court suspended the decision for twenty-
four months and the majority held that if Parliament does not act within 
the twenty-four month period to extend the definition of marriage to same-
sex couples, the common law definition of marriage will be automatically 
extended to same-sex couples at the end of that period.51  The federal 
government is appealing the decision, quite possibly to buy time, given 
that many feel that under the Charter, restricting marriage to opposite-sex 
partners will ultimately be found to be unconstitutional.  Meanwhile the 
Québec Superior Court also held that the opposite-sex definition of 
marriage contravened the Charter and, as did the Ontario court, suspended 
its declaration for two years to give the federal parliament time to change 
the definition.52 
The Conservative Backlash 
Before moving to a discussion of why marriage is so high on the agenda 
of EGALE and many lesbians and gay men, it is important to trace another 
recent development in the Canadian story of lesbian and gay claims to 
equality.  As mentioned, the last few years have seen considerable success 
in terms of legal victories and legislative change for lesbian and gay 
couples.  Needless to say, this success has not been universally applauded.  
Social conservatives, led in Canada by the Canadian Alliance party 
federally and the province of Alberta provincially, have launched a two-
pronged attack.  First, they have embarked on a “defence of marriage” 
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campaign, resonant of that in the United States.  To this end, for example, 
the province of Alberta amended its Marriage Act to add a preamble that 
included the following statement: 
Whereas marriage is the foundation of family and society, without 
which there would be neither civilization nor progress; 
Whereas marriage between a man and a woman has from time 
immemorial been firmly grounded in our legal tradition, one that 
is itself a reflection of long standing philosophical and religious 
traditions.53 
Meanwhile the Canadian Alliance party (the official opposition) has 
frequently made statements defending marriage as being “the voluntary 
union between one man and one woman” and they argued strenuously that 
the government appeal the decision in Halpern.54  These conservative 
discourses have had an effect on federal legislative initiatives.  The 
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act passed in 2000 to extend 
the application of various federal statutes to same-sex partners included a 
preamble that defended marriage as an opposite-sex relationship only.55 
The second, and more subtle, part of the conservative attack on the 
recent changes to the definition of spouse relates to registered domestic 
partnership schemes, which have been used in many jurisdictions as a way 
to recognize same-sex partnerships.56  The backlash version of the 
embracing of domestic partnerships is led by those who argue that the law 
should expand the group of people to whom spousal status is currently 
accorded by allowing any two people in a defined relationship to register 
their relationship and thus receive the rights currently enjoyed by 
spouses.57  So, for example, as the debate with respect to the inclusion of 
lesbians and gay men as spouses was being waged, the right wing Reform 
Party (now the Canadian Alliance) began to suggest that linking benefits 
to “spousal” status was unfair.  Perhaps, they argued, the marker of 
entitlement should be something else or perhaps everyone could name one 
person in their lives who would be their designated beneficiary (or some 
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such term).  Although this approach need not be a conservative or 
homophobic one,58 when these arguments were first made, they clearly 
reflected a desire to erase the visibility of lesbian and gay intimate 
relationships and possibly to avert their impending recognition.  More 
recently, they are being used to protect marriage as a heterosexual 
institution, while simultaneously respecting equality rights (sometimes 
grudgingly) by adding a parallel system of registration. 
For example, in 2002, Alberta introduced the Adult Interdependent 
Relationships Act,59 which will provide that “adult interdependent 
partners” who register their relationships will have some of the same rights 
and responsibilities as spouses, including, in particular, those that relate to 
financial support of one’s partner.60  An adult interdependent relationship 
does not include marriage but does include a relationship in which two 
persons share one another’s lives, are emotionally committed to one 
another, and function as an economic and domestic unit.61  
What is exceptional about this legislation is that if the adult 
interdependent relationship is of three or more year’s duration, then the 
persons in the relationship are automatically considered to be adult 
interdependent partners and are bound by the legislation.62  Partners who 
fit within the definition of adult interdependent partners but who have not 
been in the relationship for the requisite three-year period may register 
their partnerships.  
It is clear that this legislation has been introduced to “defend” marriage.  
The preamble refers to marriage as “an institution that has traditional 
religious, social and cultural meaning” and affirms that a spouse is a 
person who is married.63  The term spouse no longer includes common law 
relationships.  The Attorney General of Alberta stated when the bill was 
introduced that “the Alberta government believes that marriage is 
fundamentally a union between a man and a woman.”64  Not surprisingly, 
none of the government press releases on the bill even mention same-sex 
relationships.  The bill is a classic example of the move from sex to no 
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sex.  Conjugality is no longer the marker, rather it is economic 
interdependence.65 
Why Marriage? 
We now turn to the recent focus by many in the lesbian and gay 
movement on the right to legally marry.  Why, despite the fact that there is 
very little difference in Canada between the legal status of married persons 
and that of common law spouses, is marriage such a big issue?66  We 
believe that there are several reasons.  First, as we have discussed, the 
inclusion of same-sex couples as spouses has resulted in considerable 
backlash and homophobia from social conservatives and other right-
wingers.  We speculate that the more the Canadian Alliance or other right 
wing organizations argue that lesbians and gay men should never be able 
to marry, the greater the incentive will be to seek that right.67  Even the 
Canadian government has been somewhat inflammatory in its response to 
the marriage cases being brought, resorting to such regressive arguments 
as that heterosexual procreation is a “naturally occurring phenomenon” 
and that “the survival of the human race depends upon” excluding same-
sex couples from marriage.68  In Alberta, Premier Ralph Klein has stated 
that he vehemently opposes marriage for lesbians and gay men and that he 
would use the “notwithstanding” clause of the Charter to block any 
legislative attempt to allow lesbians and gay men to marry.69  Such 
statements merely strengthen the resolve of many lesbians and gay men to 
demonstrate that they should not be treated in this discriminatory manner. 
Another reason that marriage is so high on the agenda is that the issue is 
about more than legal rights and responsibilities.  There is a tremendous 
symbolism attached to marriage, a symbolism that includes public 
recognition of one’s commitment.  One has only to read some of the 
affidavits of the applicants in the marriage cases currently before the 
courts to appreciate the importance attached to having one’s relationship 
publicly celebrated.70  One of the themes that emerges is that marriage 
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brings public acknowledgement of a personal relationship and that this 
recognition will lead to more acceptance by family and friends of the 
relationship and in turn result in less homophobia in society generally.  
Another point made by many of the applicants in the marriage cases is that 
permitting same-sex couples to marry is also about being valued as 
members of society.  As Pitfield J., trial judge in the British Columbia 
same-sex marriage case, said of one of the applicants, “Ms. Young is of 
the view that having the choice to marry and having the relationship 
recognized by government and society is important to her and would make 
her feel she is no longer a second class citizen.”71  The powerful ideology 
of marriage is revealed through such statements, both on the part of those 
who advocate for same-sex marriage and those who resist it so strongly. 
Having provided a review of the state of play in relation to lesbian and 
gay legal trends in Canada, in the next part of this article we explore and 
evaluate two issues.  First, on what terms did the developments discussed 
above occur?  That is, how were the claims of lesbians and gay men for 
equality limited and framed by the existing legal and political systems?  
Secondly, what is the price to be paid for focussing so much energy on 
achieving spousal status, and now marriage?  
It is important to emphasise that we are not suggesting that the 
strategies and outcomes to date have been mistaken.  Indeed many 
lesbians and gay men have benefited materially and in other ways from the 
changes.  However, as we shall discuss, we are concerned that adopting 
the status quo in terms of the rights and responsibilities that go with 
spousal status has reinforced the existing system with all its problems, 
rather than seeking a more transformational strategy that might have 
redressed some of the more systemic problems.  Put simply, the struggles 
of the last few decades have been about the acquisition of a limited set of 
legal rights that themselves rest on profoundly hierarchical social 
relations.  As Shane Phelan puts it, key proponents of same-sex marriage 
understand marriage as the ideal liberal contract, and this paradigm 
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“downplays the inequality and subordination that are just as basic to 
Western marriage as and much more long-standing than, love and 
intimacy.”72  We have used middle class means to achieve an end that has 
somewhere along the way become deraced, declassed and degendered.  
We are now in the system but little about the system has changed.  
Arguably “[e]fforts to include same-sex marriage that do not address the 
gendered structure of marriage or its function in maintaining racial 
division will succeed at most in winning ‘equality’ for a privileged sector 
of white well-off (not-so) queers.”73  
BEYOND ASSIMILATION AND RESISTANCE  
In 1995, Urvashi Vaid identified the politics of assimilation versus the 
politics of resistance in relation to lesbian and gay politics as one way to 
understand some of the dilemmas we have identified above.74  Shane 
Phelan has more recently suggested that neither approach adequately 
problematizes the cultures they are confronting and that a more nuanced 
portrait is required.75  We tend to agree.  As is already apparent, we feel 
ambivalent about the largely successful strategy of gaining spousal 
recognition in Canada over the past decade, but we also recognize the 
huge significance of the cracks in the edifice of “family” that this strategy 
has achieved.  In the next section, we identify some reasons for our 
ambivalence and consider how ambivalence concerning the contradictory 
implications of spousal recognition might be put to political use.   
The Limits of Legal Liberalism and Equality Discourse 
First, we want to think further about how the claims of lesbians and gay 
men were framed within and by the Canadian legal system.  There is no 
doubt that using the equality guarantees of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms to argue for the extension of spousal status to same-sex 
cohabitants had a huge impact on the way challenges to discriminatory 
laws were presented in Canada.  As mentioned earlier in our discussion of 
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the Supreme Court of Canada decision on spousal support in M. v. H., 
equality rights discourse is based on comparisons.  In the context of claims 
for spousal recognition, the obvious comparator for lesbians and gay men 
is heterosexual couples.  If same-sex couples bringing Charter challenges 
forward can demonstrate that they are virtually the same as heterosexual 
couples, with the only difference being their sexual orientation, then with 
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination under the 
Charter, it is highly likely that the challenge will be successful. 
A graphic illustration of the “sameness” approach can be seen in the 
evidence put forward by litigants in the more recent same-sex marriage 
cases.  A review of the affidavits reveals that almost all of the litigants 
make the point that the only difference between them and heterosexual 
couples is that they are both the same sex.  In all other respects their 
relationship is identical to that of opposite-sex couples.  As one litigant put 
it, 
During our thirty-two years together, Bob and I have shared 
our lives, plans and finances.  We have always purchased things 
together and have never owned anything separately.  We have 
always had joint bank accounts, we owned a home together and 
we have wills, leaving all of our possessions to each other.76 
Evidence of the similarity between opposite and same-sex partners thus 
usually focuses on an assumption that couples in intimate relationships 
share everything and that they are monogamous.  Not only may this 
concept of the typical heterosexual spousal relationship be somewhat 
artificial, making these arguments serves to further “other” those who may 
not fit the mould.  Given that many in the lesbian and gay community 
celebrate and value their differences from the normative model of the 
heterosexual couple, such an approach is problematic.  This strategy is not 
“the fault” of lesbians and gay men who make claims for spousal status, as 
we discuss below.  Rather, equality discourse tends to force arguments in 
this comparative, conservative direction and thereby render the diversity 
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of intimate relationships marginal or, indeed, invisible.  However, as 
Davina Cooper has argued, equality analysis need not be limited to a 
comparative, quantitative paradigm, and can also be used to contest the 
social relations of inequality more generally.77  We return to this point 
later in this article. 
Spousal Recognition Produces Disadvantages as well as Advantages: The 
Implications of Gender and Class 
Our next concern about the results of legally recognizing same-sex 
couples as “family” is often overlooked: spousal recognition does not 
bring only positive advantages for lesbians and gay men.  Rather, 
depending on factors such as class and gender, spousal recognition may 
generate more disadvantages, notably financial penalties.  Furthermore, 
these disadvantages tend to be borne by those who can least afford them, 
women and those with low incomes.  Indeed, the positive element of 
symbolic recognition of same-sex relationships is too often accompanied 
by a negative element of exacerbated economic disadvantage.  
A stark example is the inclusion of same-sex couples as spouses under 
the Income Tax Act.  There are two particularly unfortunate tax 
consequences.78  First, the change will result in a considerable tax grab by 
the government.  This consequence is attributable to the rules that require 
the combining of spouses’ income for the purposes of the refundable GST 
(goods and services tax) tax credit and the Canada Child Tax Benefit.79  
This requirement results in an overall reduction in the value of the credit 
because the taxpayers are no longer treated as individuals.  The result is 
that they will pay more tax.  Secondly, serious class implications arise as a 
result of the change.  Put simply, those with lower incomes will likely pay 
more tax than they would if they were to continue to be treated as 
individuals, while those with higher incomes are more likely to pay less 
tax than they would if they were treated as individuals.80  There may also 
be gender implications.  Given that women tend to earn less than men and 
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have lower incomes generally, lesbians are more likely to suffer a greater 
disadvantage than gay men.  Importantly, some of this disadvantage is 
incurred involuntarily.  Many Canadian laws, including the income tax 
laws, deem partners to be spouses (or spousal equivalents) once they 
cohabit for as little as one year, regardless of how the partners themselves 
define their relationship. 
Another example of the economic disadvantage that flows from spousal 
status that is sometimes ascribed involuntarily can be found in relation to 
financial assistance to students.  On August 1, 2001, regulations on 
Canada Students Loans and Canada Student Financial Assistance were 
changed to acknowledge same-sex common-law couples.81  A common-
law partner will be “recognized” if she or he “co-habited with a borrower 
in a conjugal relationship, having so co-habited for a period of at least one 
year.”82  In a country where tuition fees are on the rise and it is harder for 
students to afford advanced education, a live-in partner’s income will now 
be taken into account when a student applies for loans or bursaries.  This 
income will affect the needs assessment process and disqualify some 
students who otherwise would have qualified, even if they have cohabited 
for only one year.  
These are but two examples of the problems that can arise for 
individuals as a result of legal recognition as partners.  In a larger context, 
however, this form of equality has the potential to exacerbate already 
existing, systemic economic disadvantage.  Of course, all spouses, whether 
opposite or same-sex, incur the same consequences from these rules.  The 
problem is that lesbians and gay men have, in seeking recognition for our 
relationships, reinforced a class based disadvantage without using the 
radical aspects of our relationships to challenge the fundamental 
underlying class and gender hierarchies that are built into the system.  
Calhoun has suggested it is unfair to put the onus on lesbians and gay men 
seeking recognition to “transform gender relations, to remedy class-related 
inequities, and to end the privileging of long-term, monogamous 
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relations.”83  However, unless these questions are made central to lesbian 
and gay politics, they will fall by the wayside in the quest for equality by 
lesbians and gay men.   In this era of neo-conservative (United States) and 
neo-liberal (Canada) politics, where the dominant trend is to render these 
issues invisible, it is especially important to challenge that trend in any 
progressive social movement. 
The Broader Context: Privatization of Social and Economic 
Responsibilities 
When considering these issues it is important to place them against the 
current backdrop of the ongoing privatization of social and economic 
responsibilities.  One of the hallmarks of the current neo-liberal era in 
Canada is an increasing privatization of economic responsibility for 
individuals’ economic security and a retrenchment of the welfare state that 
had existed, at least in a limited fashion, setting Canada apart from the 
United States.84  Cutbacks to social assistance programs, the emergence of 
workfare programs, and an increasing emphasis on the private family as 
being responsible for the care of the elderly and disabled in society have 
characterized this period.  These trends in turn have a disproportionately 
harsh impact on women, those living in poverty and/or with disabilities, 
groups that often require more proactive assistance from society. 
Our concern is that by including same-sex couples as spouses the 
government is further reducing its fiscal responsibilities to its citizens by 
assigning that responsibility to the private same-sex family, with a 
significantly unequal impact on citizens.  Thus, for example, if our 
relationships end, we may be required to provide spousal support to our 
partners, thereby alleviating the state’s economic responsibility.85  Our 
incomes are aggregated for the purposes of many state benefits such as 
social assistance and student loans, thereby resulting in less access to state 
funding and placing more responsibility on the private sector.  We can 
receive spousal survivor pensions provided by a deceased spouse’s 
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employer, thereby lessening our reliance on (and our entitlement to) the 
more universal public pensions.  Moreover, trends that bolster 
privatization of economic responsibility tend to diminish general public 
support for publicly funded programs, especially among those who are 
already relatively economically privileged and can insulate themselves 
from the impact of cutbacks.86 
In a political climate that endorses individual rather than collective 
responsibility for well-being, we tend to not ask questions to which lesbian 
feminists especially have drawn attention.  For example, why should 
access to such economic goods as insurance or housing depend on one’s 
“family or spouse-like status, which is in turn proven through other 
economic accomplishments (such as joint bank accounts)?”87  As Ruthann 
Robson wisely points out, we are all too apt to fall into a stance that 
assumes that obtaining benefits available to spouses is positive; this stance 
misses the point that the way we distribute benefits in many societies is 
highly flawed: 
This approach prioritizes the individual’s problem of an 
inequitable position within the wealth-distribution system over 
the problem of collective inequities in the distribution of wealth.  
A criticism of this approach is that obtaining a benefit such as 
health insurance should not be dependent on being ‘related’ to an 
individual sufficiently privileged to have insured employment: the 
problem is not simply that some people (who would be insured 
but for their lack of legal relation to a insured worker) are denied 
insurance but that anyone is denied insurance.88  
To Robson’s analysis we would add that even within the current system 
of wealth distribution, spousal recognition can generate economic 
disadvantages for particular couples rather than advantages, a key example 
again being the income tax system in Canada, as discussed above. 
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A WAY FORWARD? AVOIDING EITHER/OR SOLUTIONS 
What are the implications of our analysis?  We will now consider 
whether there is a way forward in these debates that avoids either/or 
answers to whether spousal recognition is a good or a bad strategy.  We 
believe that this question, as well as whether we should either “assimilate” 
or “resist,” is too narrowly framed.  In this part we discuss several issues, 
including working to achieve “formal equality” and then working towards 
a broader notion of equality, decentring lesbians and gay men as equality’s 
primary concern, and decentring sex (and marriage). 
Change from Within? 
One possibility is that, as some feminists have argued in the past, it may 
be necessary to achieve “formal equality” before a social group can be in a 
position to challenge the substantive inequities of the current situation.  
Thus, we might first struggle within the limits of liberal equality discourse 
to achieve the rights that many lesbians and gays seek, that is to have their 
intimate relationships recognized and treated equally with those of 
heterosexuals.  Once so empowered, we might then struggle for a broader 
notion of equality that addresses the redistribution of wealth more 
generally.  For instance, the security of being legally recognized as 
“family” potentially provides security and an avenue for lesbian and gay 
groups to turn political attention to work more closely in coalition with 
anti-poverty groups, presumably with greater legitimacy as “equal” 
citizens.  Can this moment of achieving something close (in Canada at 
least) to formal equality be used to point out the gender-based, race-based, 
and class-based results of “success?”  Now that legal recognition has 
occurred, can this enhanced position be employed to work for further 
change?  
Difficulties with this approach are that, not only might we be so eager 
for recognition that we may settle for too little, but also, political 
complacency may result once spousal recognition is attained.89  Once 
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symbolic and legal recognition of queer families is achieved, the political 
strategy will be incomplete unless a trenchant critique emerges of the 
limits of such recognition in delivering redistribution of economic well-
being.  Thus far, there is little evidence that those seeking spousal 
recognition in Canada are beginning to shift the focus towards the broader 
issues.  For example, the national lesbian and gay lobby group EGALE 
has given little indication as yet that it intends to embrace these issues 
directly.  At a grassroots level, lesbian and gay groups are focusing on 
inclusivity by, for example, working on issues respecting transgendered 
and transsexual persons. They are not necessarily focusing on issues of 
poverty, which tend to be left to anti-poverty groups to work on.90  
Moreover, it is possible that those who raise concerns about spousal 
recognition as a strategy are viewed somewhat as traitors to the cause, 
particularly at a moment when Canadians are being asked to respond to 
various reform options proposed by the federal government, which include 
same-sex marriage.91  Certainly, at an intellectual level, those who raise 
the broader issues have been charged with failing to place the interests of 
lesbians and gays at the centre of our analysis.92 The space for debate thus 
appears to be limited and the opportunity to coalesce around these issues 
and challenge the neo-liberal agenda is being missed. 
Shift the Gaze Outwards 
Davina Cooper’s recent work provides another way of thinking about 
this question. Cooper argues for a more equivocal response, rather than 
choosing one side or the other of the debate.  She suggests that spousal 
recognition is an historically embedded development, a product not only 
of the increasing shift towards formal gay equality that we have identified 
in our paper, but also, significantly, of “the failure to develop more 
collective forms of commitment and responsibility, in fields such as 
health, poverty, transport, and migration.”93  Thus, it is wrong to criticize 
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lesbians and gay men who develop “a conjugal gaze and imaginary,” as 
this vision is a reasonable response to social conditions.94  
Cooper points to two levels of analysis that are key.  Interestingly, she 
adopts an—at first glance surprising—approach of decentring the group 
(e.g. lesbians and gay men) as equality’s primary concern, instead 
focusing on the individual—using an equality of power theory that she has 
previously elaborated—and on the organizing principles that structure 
societies.  She suggests that we must look both to individuals (as, after all, 
the very reason for challenging social inequalities derives from people’s 
ethical entitlement to equal participation and benefits from society), 
seeking to provide all with the same level of capacity to shape their 
environment, and also to the social inequalities and asymmetries that 
pattern and organize our society.  Cooper emphasizes “the importance of 
recognising the intersections between different forms of social inequality, 
as well as the way in which they interact with legitimised forms of social 
ordering.”95  
Thus, Cooper suggests that without disparaging spousal recognition as a 
consciously chosen political strategy, we must at the same time consider 
its impact on other social relations and other organizing principles of 
society.  The fact that spousal recognition as a political strategy has arisen 
for concrete reasons does not eliminate our responsibility to carefully 
examine how spousal recognition intersects with other social and 
economic issues that progressive and radical forces have struggled with 
for decades.  We return at this point to the wider context of privatization 
and the difficulty in the current global context of articulating collectivist 
visions for citizenships and social responsibility. 
As Cooper’s work indicates, spousal recognition has a tendency to ask 
us to look inwards rather than outwards, especially given the privatizing 
impulse of family in the current conjuncture: “Quintessentially then, 
spousal recognition is not about relating equally and positively towards 
strangers, except in as much [sic] as the spousal partner has shifted from 
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legal stranger to kin.”96  The challenge is how to honour individual quests 
for intimacy whilst at the same time strengthening social or collective 
responsibility towards those who are not regarded as intimates.  Cooper’s 
approach thus moves away from the “either/or” dichotomy.  Cooper raises 
the possibility that if same-sex spousal recognition provides a way of 
giving legitimacy and publicity to norms that assert greater spousal and 
familial democracy and a fairer, more equal gender division of labour, 
then these more progressive familial values may have a broader impact.  
Drawing on Morris Kaplan, she notes that since spousal recognition for 
lesbians and gay men is directed mainly at third parties, albeit notably 
those with political and economic power (e.g. in the legal system), then the 
possibility exists of shifting the focus away from the introspective norms 
of spousal space to more public-oriented norms.97  The difficulty rests, of 
course, in how to generate this shift in a political climate that supports 
self-interested, individualistic, inward-looking strategies for survival 
rather than collective ones. 
Same-Sex Marriage? 
Given Cooper’s suggestion that it is not helpful to dismiss the move 
towards spousal recognition, how should we assess same-sex marriage or 
registered partnerships?  As Nancy Polikoff has said, many of the debates 
about the merits of marriage and spousal recognition were academic until 
recently, but they are no longer.98  Cheshire Calhoun makes the powerful 
suggestion that precisely because the idea that lesbians and gay men are 
unfit for family is so central to the ideological construction of lesbian and 
gay identity, family issues must be placed at the very center of lesbian and 
gay politics.  This line of thought, which Calhoun and others such as Cox 
have presented so persuasively is, we think, problematically grounded in 
an acceptance of marriage and family as a central organizing feature of 
citizenship.99  While Calhoun presents much evidence of how lesbian 
feminist critiques of “family” have failed to place lesbian concerns at the 
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center of analysis, we cannot accept the part of her analysis that reinforces 
the place of marriage and family as key institutions that necessarily must 
organize society, identity, and the distribution of wealth and benefits. 
Marriage is, in some sense, an individualistic act that fits well within 
our neo-liberal times:  everyone for herself, not relying on the community.  
Feminist critiques have long exposed this ideology of marriage, and the 
difficulty of challenging this social construction from within.  Shane 
Phelan extends this type of analysis by thinking about its implications for 
citizenship.  She accepts that extending marriage rights to same-sex 
couples will “change cultural assumptions about who may and does love 
whom, about the meaning of reproductivity and parenting.”100  However, 
she quickly adds that this does not mean that assumptions about the 
relationship between kinship and citizenship will change: “we run the risk 
of reconsolidating the idea of the responsible citizen as economically 
independent—or at least married to a provider—thus removing the burden 
of notice and care from other citizens.”101  
Why Marriage at All? Decentring Sex 
On this issue, Martha Fineman’s work is instructive.102  Nancy Polikoff 
has recently followed Fineman’s arguments that marriage as a legal 
category should be abolished—although ceremonies could continue—
because it fails to envision a truly transformative model of family for all 
people and is problematically embedded in liberal notions of equality and 
choice.103  These arguments are resonant of earlier feminist critiques of 
marriage and calls for the de-centring of marriage as a tool of regulation.  
In 1984, in an argument that tends to be forgotten at this point in time, 
Carol Smart pointed out that marriage might not be retrievable by 
feminists; that the most significant power struggles may be found within 
marriage, struggles that are resistant to amelioration via modest reforms.104 
Almost inevitably, marriage as an ideological “enclosure” prioritizes 
coupledom and heterosexuality, a norm against which all else is measured; 
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as well, it becomes the privileged context for reproduction of children.105  
As Smart astutely pointed out, marriage was thus “as significant to the 
unmarried as to the married and to the homosexual as to the 
heterosexual.”106  The aim of feminists such as Smart who were critical of 
marriage as a social construction was not to extend the legal and social 
definition of marriage to cover those who had been excluded, but rather to 
abandon the status of marriage altogether and devise a system of rights 
and obligations that are not dependent on “coupledom,” marriage or quasi-
marriage.  
Somewhat unusually in American intellectual thought, Fineman has not 
been shy to challenge the centrality of marriage and family to social and 
legal regulation, and her recent work has re-awakened these debates.  She 
has emphasized relationships of dependency instead of the adult sexual 
dyad.  In her 1995 book The Neutered Mother,107 Fineman suggested that 
marriage should be replaced with protection of the “Mother-Child” Dyad 
as the core, legally privileged family connection, a metaphor for the 
relationship between inevitable dependants and their caretakers.  These 
relationships, for Fineman and Polikoff, are the ones that need the 
resources and protection of society. Other benefits, such as health care, 
would be extended on an individual basis, thus eliminating the necessity to 
focus on adult, sexually intimate relationships.  Since neither opposite-sex 
nor same-sex relationships would receive legal recognition by the state, 
both would in that sense be equal. 
In 2001, the Law Commission of Canada embraced some of these ideas 
by asking whether the law should move away from the granting of rights 
and responsibilities on the basis of spousal status to some other marker, for 
example, relationship of “emotional and economic dependence.”108  In a 
somewhat related move, although distancing itself from the broader—and 
more radical—question raised by the Law Commission, the Government 
of Canada recently offered as one reform option the possibility of 
removing all legal effect from marriage, leaving it exclusively to the 
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religions.109  A new system for organizing legal rights and responsibilities 
of those in intimate relationships would therefore have to be devised, 
opening an opportunity for revisioning the framework within which we 
consider these relationships.  Bruce MacDougall has suggested that 
whereas extension of recognition of same-sex relationships, for instance in 
the M. v. H. spousal support context, is mainly an “assimilative measure,” 
“[e]xtension of benefits to friends and siblings and so on would be much 
more corrosive of traditional conceptions of family and support and 
conjugality.”110 
This revisiting of how states allocate rights and responsibilities may 
lead to a position that may well de-sex the way we allocate rights and 
responsibilities.  This argument has considerable attraction.  But, it should 
be noted that this arguably less assimilative trend is occurring at the 
moment from a less than radical stance.  The more the state recognizes 
private dependencies and responsibilities in the current neo-liberal 
economic climate, the more likely it is that it will tend to offload 
responsibility onto those private relationships, resulting in more 
expectations being made of those relationships in terms of taking care of 
“their own.”  At the same time there is also a concern that the more 
relationships are recognized by the state, the more state intervention will 
result in terms of regulating the way those relationships operate.  From a 
different angle, Davina Cooper has suggested, at the turn of the 21st 
century, we are witnessing “the institutional pervasiveness of private 
norms in the popular discourse of social inclusion,” so that “private 
norms” of belonging, familialism, and home are increasingly dominating 
public discourse.111  These norms do not tend to challenge social 
inequalities; rather they reflect established interests that exclude and 
alienate others.  “Hegemonic private norms…reflect a sensibility and form 
of organisation based on discipline, consumption, limited responsibility, 
and a zero-sum conception of belonging.”112 
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Phelan asserts that the primary change we really need is “the erosion of 
the idea of kin relations as the only people upon whom one may 
legitimately call for aid in times of need.”113  As she points out, the most 
significant “success story” in this regard is the response of the lesbian and 
gay communities to AIDS, with caring networks being established without 
necessary reference to kinship.114  However, again, this development 
occurred within, and was constrained by, the capitalist society within 
which we live.  The “very success of these groups in acquiring state 
funding has led them to adopt dominant goals and imperatives.  
Governmental preferences for research and prevention programs—not to 
mention criminal law—over care for people living with HIV or AIDS has 
meant that the original “family”-focused organizations have given way to 
corporate campaigns that no longer challenge ideas of kinship.”115   We 
suggest that merely expanding the nature of relationships that are 
recognized by the state only reinforces the privatization of economic 
responsibility.  The only difference is that the private sphere is made 
larger. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, we are left with a dilemma that relates to different levels of 
analysis.  On the one hand, we agree with those who argue that in the 
longer term, marriage as a legal category should be abolished, and that 
public financial preferences for limited forms of sexual relationships are 
discriminatory.  However, as long as marriage exists as a legal institution, 
it should be open to same-sex couples.  We also feel that domestic 
partnership schemes should be available as well for those opposite and 
same-sex partners who wish to avoid the ideological baggage of marriage.  
As mentioned above, some are concerned about how ironic it is that as 
soon as lesbians and gay men begin to acquire spousal status, the move is 
to erase sex from that status, and to eliminate marriage as a legal category.  
As a result of such concerns, the Lesbian and Gay Legal Rights Service in 
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New South Wales, Australia proposed a model that included simultaneous 
but distinct recognition of both a “de facto partner” and a “domestic 
partner” regime, the former to recognize live-in sexual relationships, and 
the latter to recognize other forms of important interdependent 
relationships.116  Both were to be based on a presumption-based 
(ascription) rather than an opt-in system, in order to deal with power 
imbalances within relationships that may inhibit some from opting into a 
registration system. 
That said, ascription too has its downside.  In our community work we 
hear all too often, especially from older, poorer lesbian couples, that they 
are furious with our federal government for now making them legal 
spouses without them having agreed to this status.  This anger arises from 
the fact that laws dealing with economic issues all too often penalize 
legally recognized couples who are not economically secure.  This too is a 
problem that can be linked to restructuring and privatization of economic 
responsibilities in late capitalism.  A second point is that many couples 
who choose to live their lives in different and non conformist ways do not 
want to be the “conventional” couple that the law tries to make them be.  
For them the law destroys the radical essence and potential of their 
relationship.  One avenue to consider is that in non-financial areas (e.g. 
medical visits, immigration), there could be state recognition of intimate 
and important relationships based on the individual’s decision as to the 
importance of the relationship.116  Such a measure would allow some 
freedom for couples to determine how their relationships will be defined.  
Other mechanisms could ensure that financial exploitation is not allowed 
to occur without a remedy. 
The tensions that are obvious in these concluding remarks reflect the 
tensions in the issues we are considering.  There is no obvious solution; 
rather we argue, with authors such as Kris Walker, that we need to seek 
changes to the economic conditions that make it so important for (some) 
gay men and lesbians to seek marriage.  In order to do so, we need to 
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focus not only on the questions of recognition of same-sex relationships, 
but also to forge coalitions with other excluded “families.” 117 
In the end, we remain convinced that achieving recognition for lesbian 
and gay relationships will ultimately connote “progress” only when the 
links between recognized relationships and socio-economic inequalities 
within capitalism are fully exposed and challenged.  This remains the 
challenge for the lesbian and gay communities: not to become complacent 
now that at least partial recognition has occurred.  Some might argue that 
posing the questions in this way takes the sex out of queer politics—or the 
lesbian out of lesbian feminist politics, as Calhoun might say.  We would 
respond that the questions now being raised by the very challenge of 
recognizing same-sex relationships are relevant to all citizens, not only 
lesbian and gay citizens, and to all who are concerned with achieving 
social justice.  Although we are not convinced that Fineman’s re-focusing 
of attention on relations of inevitable dependency is necessarily sufficient, 
it certainly points to a different approach to which relationships state 
policy should recognize.  Accordingly, a focus on sex may well be 
unnecessary, except to the extent that it is needed to ensure the visibility of 
lesbian and gay lives, and that they are not erased in the very process of 
receiving recognition. 
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